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Notional deﬁned contribution pension schemes: why does only
Sweden distribute the survivor dividend?
Carlos Vidal-Meliáa, María del Carmen Boado-Penasb* and Francisco Navarro-Caboc
aDepartment of Financial Economics and Actuarial Science, University of Valencia, Valencia,
Spain; bDepartment of Mathematical Sciences, Institute for Financial and Actuarial Mathematics
(IFAM), University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK; cDepartment of Beneﬁts-Retirement,
Towers Watson de España S.A., Madrid, Spain
The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of the survivor dividend in notional
deﬁned contribution (NDC) pension schemes. At present, this feature can only be
found in the Swedish deﬁned contribution scheme. We develop a model that
endorses the idea that the survivor dividend has a strong basis for enabling the
NDC scheme to achieve ﬁnancial equilibrium and that not including the dividend is
a non-transparent way of compensating for increases in longevity and/or legacy
costs from old pension systems. We also ﬁnd that the average effect of the dividend
remains unchanged for any constant annual rate of population growth, that contribu-
tors who reach retirement age always get a higher return than the scheme does, and
that population growth enables cohorts with more years of contributions to beneﬁt
to a greater extent from the dividend effect.
Keywords: internal rate of return; ﬁnancial equilibrium; longevity risk; pay-as-you-go;
public pensions; retirement; transparency
JEL Classiﬁcations: E62, H55, J26, M41
1. Introduction
The introduction of what are known as notional (or non-ﬁnancial) deﬁned contribution
pension accounts (NDCs), as a component of modern multi-pillar pension systems in
some countries, has been one of the main innovations of the last two decades as
regards pension reform. They can be found in Italy (1995), Kyrgyzstan (1997), Latvia
(1996), Poland (1999), Sweden (1999), Brazil1 (1999) and Mongolia (2000). Other
countries such as Germany, Austria, France, Finland, Portugal and Norway have
incorporated some sort of adjustment mechanism that can also be found in NDCs to
help calculate or index the initial retirement pension. According to Holzmann, Palmer,
and Robalino (2012), many countries, including Egypt, China and Greece, are seriously
considering the introduction of NDCs.2
A NDC scheme is a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme that deliberately mimics a
ﬁnancial deﬁned contribution (FDC) scheme by paying an income stream whose pre-
sent value over a person’s expected remaining lifetime equals the accumulated capital
at retirement.
The practical application of NDCs ﬁrst came about in the early 1990s, and since
the mid-1990s they have been introduced in a number of countries. For Holzmann and
*Corresponding author. Email: Carmen.Boado@liverpool.ac.uk
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Palmer (2012), NDC schemes work well from a practical point of view, as shown by
the experiences of Italy, Latvia, Poland and Sweden, but they could be made to work
even better.
This paper deals speciﬁcally with the so-called survivor dividend (also known as
inheritance gains), which is distributed in the saving phase on a birth cohort basis from
the account balances of participants who do not survive to retirement in NDC pension
schemes.3 This feature can currently only be found in the Swedish deﬁned contribution
(DC) scheme.
According to Pensionsmyndigheten (2013), the Swedish pension scheme aims to
redistribute resources from individuals with shorter-than-average life spans to those
who live longer during the pay-out (or decumulation) phase. This arrangement works
in exactly the same way as in DC-funded pillars, when the beneﬁciary chooses the
pay-out option of receiving the retirement beneﬁt as a life annuity. NDC schemes do
not allow phased withdrawals,4 where the retirement savings of deceased beneﬁciaries
are distributed to their inheritors. Unlike with the DC-funded pillar, in the pay-in
phase, the pension balances of deceased persons are redistributed each year to surviv-
ing insured persons in the same birth cohort. This entitlement is completely different
from the inheritance options in DC-funded pillars, where the accumulated capital in
the individual account is distributed to inheritors and/or transformed into a survivor
beneﬁt.
Very little attention has been paid to the subject of the survivor dividend in the
economic literature. Not even the report published by the Swedish authorities,
Pensionsmyndigheten (2013), explains in depth its actuarial foundation and the effect
it has on the scheme’s ﬁnancial equilibrium. As far as we know, the paper by
Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá (2014) is the only one that has shed any light on
whether it would be justiﬁed to include the survivor dividend when calculating afﬁli-
ate pension balances in an NDC framework with no population changes. It concludes
that including the survivor dividend in the calculation of the initial pension is by no
means irrelevant because the pension could rise by up to 21.84% depending on the
mortality scenario used.
The aim of this paper is to carry out an in-depth analysis of the role of the survivor
dividend in NDC schemes. With this aim in mind, we ﬁrst extend the model developed
by Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá (2014). Second, we show that contributors who reach
retirement age always get a higher return than the scheme does, and that population
growth enables cohorts with more years of contributions to beneﬁt to a greater extent
from the dividend effect. The results reached in the numerical example we present
endorse the fact that the model really works.
Following this brief introduction, in Section 2 we present the model. Its main
novelties are the introduction of changes in the growth of the active population and
the possibility of exploring the effect of the survivor dividend on the relationship
between the individual’s internal rate of return (IRR) for contributors and the
scheme’s IRR. In Section 3, we present a complex example representative of a gen-
eric NDC scheme. Speciﬁcally, we provide a numerical illustration of the effects of
the survivor dividend on the scheme’s ﬁnancial equilibrium when the economically
active population is not constant, plus the impact of the survivor dividend on the
individual’s IRR for contributors who reach retirement age. The paper ends with con-
clusions, possible directions for future research and Appendix 1 with some proofs of
the formulas used in Section 2.
2 C. Vidal-Meliá et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 V
ale
nc
ia]
 at
 03
:41
 16
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
2. The model
In this section, we extend the actuarial overlapping generations model developed by
Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá (2014) based on those ﬁrst put forward by Settergren and
Mikula (2005), Boado-Penas, Valdés-Prieto, and Vidal-Meliá (2008) and Vidal-Meliá
and Boado-Penas (2013). These papers were to some extent inspired by the accounting
framework for organizing, summarizing and interpreting data on transfer systems and
the life cycle developed in Lee (1994), Willis (1988) and Arthur and McNicoll (1978).
As we will see later, the main extensions to this model are the introduction of
changes in the economically active population, the possibility of exploring the effect of
the survivor dividend on the relationship between the individual’s IRR for contributors
who reach retirement age and the scheme’s IRR.
The model’s main features and assumptions are:
• The rate credited to the individual, θa, is ﬁxed over time.
• The initial pension depends on the value of the accumulated notional account, the
expected mortality of the cohort in the year the contributor reaches retirement,
and a future indexation rate, k, i.e. pensions in payment increase or decrease at
an annual rate of k.
• The accumulated capital in the notional account reﬂects each participant’s individ-
ual contributions and the ﬁctitious returns these contributions generate over the
course of the participant’s working life, plus the inheritance capital.
• The account balances of participants who do not survive to retirement are dis-
tributed as inheritance capital to the accounts of surviving participants on a birth
cohort basis.
• The scheme does not provide a minimum pension.
• Contributions and beneﬁts are payable yearly in advance.
• Participants’ lives last (w – 1 − xe) periods, where (w − 1) is the highest age to
which it is possible to survive and xe is the earliest age of entry into the pension
scheme.
• The age giving entitlement to retirement pension, xe + A, is ﬁxed.
• The individual contribution base grows at an annual rate of g.
• The economically active population increases or decreases over time at an annual
rate of c, affecting all groups of contributors equally.
• The scheme’s income from contributions (wage bill) also grows (decreases) at
rate G = (1 + g)(1 + c) − 1.
• When the pension scheme reaches a mature state, t = w − 1 − xe − A years from
inception, A generations of contributors and (w − (xe + A)) generations of
pensioners coexist at each moment in time.
The demographic–ﬁnancial structure at any moment t is given by:
(1) Age:
xe; xe þ 1; xe þ 2; . . .xe þ A 1;
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{Contributors’ ages
xe þ A; xe þ Aþ 1; . . .w 1|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Pensioners’ textages
(1)
Journal of Economic Policy Reform 3
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(2) Number of contributors by age at time t:
Nðxe;tÞ ¼ N ðxe;1Þ  ð1þ cÞ
t1;Nðxeþ1;tÞ
¼ Nðxeþ1;1Þ  ð1þ cÞt1; . . .;NðxeþA1;tÞ ¼ N ðxeþA1;1Þ  ð1þ cÞ
t1 (2)
where Nðxeþk;1Þ¼ Nðxe;1Þkpxe , with kpxe being the probability that an individual aged xe
will be alive at age xe + k.
(3) Average wage by age at time t:
yðxe;tÞ ¼ yðxe;1Þ  ð1þ gÞt1; yðxeþ1;tÞ ¼ yðxeþ1;1Þ  ð1þ gÞt1; . . .; yðxeþA1;tÞ
¼ yðxeþA1;1Þ  ð1þ gÞt1 (3)
This demographic structure means that the age–wage structure (contribution bases) only
undergoes proportional changes. The slope of the age–wage structure is constant.
After the main assumptions have been detailed, for the sake of clarity, this section
will be divided into three subsections: a description of the pension scheme in the
mature state, the deﬁnition and calculation of the survivor dividend and the effect of
the survivor dividend on the scheme’s ﬁnancial equilibrium.
2.1. Description of the pension scheme in the mature state
The main implications of the NDC scheme being in a mature state are (1) it pays full
beneﬁts to all generations of retirement pensioners, (2) the dependency ratio,5 drt, stabi-
lizes and (3) the ﬁnancial ratio, frt, is constant due to the fact that the average pension
and the average contribution base evolve at the rate of variation in wages. Hence, the
total contribution rate (θt) that ensures equality between contribution revenue and
pension expenditure is constant over time, and the scheme’s income from contributions
is equivalent to the present actuarial value of the pensions awarded in that year.
The initial average pension in year t for those individuals who reach retirement age
xe + A, PðxeþA;tÞ, can be calculated as:
PðxeþA;tÞ ¼
KacTðxeþA;tÞ
NðxeþA;tÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
KacðxeþA;tÞ
 1
€akxeþA
¼
PA
c¼1
PðxeþA;c;tÞ  NðxeþA;c;tÞ
NðxeþA;tÞ
(4)
where NðxeþA;tÞ is the number of contributors aged xe + A, whereas NðxeþA;c;tÞ is the
number of contributors aged xe + A who have been contributing for the last c years.
Therefore, NðxeþA;tÞ ¼
PA
c¼1 NðxeþA;c;tÞ.
€akxeþA ¼
PwxeA1
k¼0
1þk
1þG
h ik
 kpxeþA is the present value at age xe + A of 1 monetary
unit of a lifetime pension payable in advance and indexed at rate λ, with a technical
interest rate equal to G. This is also called the annuity factor or actuarial divisor, with
kpxeþA being the probability that an individual aged xe + A will be alive at age
xe + A + k.
KacTðxeþA;tÞ is the total accumulated notional capital at time t for all individuals who
reach age xe + A. Therefore, KacTðxeþA;tÞ ¼
PA
c¼1 K
ac
ðxeþA;c;tÞ  NðxeþA;c;tÞ, where KacðxeþA;c;tÞ
4 C. Vidal-Meliá et al.
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represents the accumulated notional capital at age xe + A for one individual who has
been contributing for the last c years.
KacðxeþA;tÞ ¼
KacTðxeþA;tÞ
NðxeþA;tÞ
is the average accumulated notional capital at time t for one indi-
vidual aged xe + A.
Henceforth, F will be used to denote 1þk1þG
h i
throughout this paper.
With population growth of c[ 0, once the individual joins the labour market, he/
she will continue working nonstop until retirement age. The only exit from the labour
market in this model is early death. Therefore, there are A different contribution path-
ways that will determine A different pensions, as contributors might be working for
1 year, 2 years,…, A − 1 years.
Contributions of individuals who die before reaching retirement age are included in
the notional capital. Consequently, in the case of γ > 0, PðxeþA;c;tÞ is the initial pension at
ordinary retirement age for individuals who entered the labour market at age xe + A − c,
i.e. for one individual who has been contributing for the last c years, whereas, PðxeþA;tÞ
is the average pension for individuals who retire at the ordinary retirement age, this
being a weighted average pension of the A different pensions once settled.
As formula (4) shows, in line with the deﬁnition of an NDC scheme being one that
deliberately mimics an FDC scheme, the process for calculating the initial amount of
the retirement pension is similar to the one used for calculating the future instalments
of a deferred lifetime annuity, a type of annuity contract where payments are not
scheduled to begin until a future date, in this case, the age of retirement.
The balanced contribution rate, θt, makes spending on pensions equal to the
revenue from contributions, and hence:
ht 
XA1
k¼0
yðxeþk;tÞ  Nðxeþk;tÞ
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{Aggregate contributions
¼ PðxeþA;tÞ 
Xt1
k¼0
NðxeþAþk;tÞ  Fk
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{NðxeþA;tÞ€akxeþA
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Expenditure on pensions
(5)
Therefore, once the mature state is reached, the macro contribution rate, θt, is constant
from an actuarial point of view and can be expressed as the product of the dependency
ratio and the ﬁnancial ratio:
ht ¼ drt  frt ¼
PðxeþA;tÞ 
XwxeA1
k¼0
NðxeþAþk;tÞFk
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{Expenditure on pensions
XA1
k¼0
yðxeþk;tÞ  Nðxeþk;tÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Contribution base
¼ htþ1 ¼    ¼ h (6)
2.2. Deﬁnition and determination of the survivor dividend when the economically
active population increases
As in the Swedish NDC scheme, we follow the principle that each monetary unit
contributed is paid out in the form of a retirement or old-age beneﬁt, but not
necessarily to the individual who made the contributions. An accumulated survivor
Journal of Economic Policy Reform 5
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dividend is included for any individual who reaches retirement age. The account
balances of participants who do not survive to retirement are distributed as inheritance
capital to the accounts of survivors on a birth cohort basis.6
In this model, the amount of the survivor dividend can mainly be quantiﬁed using
formulas (7) and (8).
Formula (7) shows the mathematical expression of the accumulated survivor
dividend at retirement age at time t for an individual who belongs to the initial group
(that entered the scheme at age xe), and has therefore contributed since entering the
pension scheme:
DacðxeþA;A;tÞ ¼ KacðxeþA;A;tÞ  ha 
XA1
k¼0
yðxeþk;AþkþtÞ  ð1þ GÞAk|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
KiðxeþA;A;tÞ
¼
XA1
k¼1
Dðxeþk;AþkþtÞ  ð1þ GÞAk (7)
where Dðxeþk;AþkþtÞ is the dividend distributed at time t − A + k for individuals aged
xe + k.
As mentioned above, the accumulated survivor dividend at a speciﬁc age is the por-
tion of the credited account balances of participants resulting from the distribution, on
a birth cohort basis, of the account balances of participants who do not survive to
retirement. In other words, it is the difference between credited capital KacðxeþA;A;tÞ, which
includes contributions and indexation on contributions for members from the same
cohort who died, and individual credited notional capital KiðxeþA;A;tÞ.
When the economically active population grows over time (see Section 2.1), there
are A different contribution pathways that will determine A different contribution pro-
ﬁles. Formula (7) therefore needs to be modiﬁed to account for the different proﬁles.
Formula (8) quantiﬁes the average accumulated dividend at age xe + A, taking into
account the different A contribution proﬁles:
DacðxeþA;tÞ ¼
PA
c¼1
DacðxeþA;c;tÞ  NðxeþA;c;tÞ
NðxeþA;tÞ
¼ KacðxeþA;tÞ  K
i
ðxeþA;tÞ
¼ 1
NðxeþA;tÞ
ha
XA1
k¼0
Nðxeþk;AþkþtÞ  yðxeþk;AþkþtÞ  ð1þ GÞAk
"

XA
c¼1
KiðxeþA;c;tÞ  NðxeþA;c;tÞ
#
(8)
In short, when the active population increases, the accumulated dividend for the
individual who reaches retirement age depends on the mortality rates by age, the rate
of population growth and the number of years contributed.
2.3. The effect of the survivor dividend on the scheme’s ﬁnancial equilibrium
The survivor dividend plays a crucial role in the scheme’s ﬁnancial equilibrium and – as
shown in Appendix 1 – it is easy to prove the equivalence between the macro (balanced)
contribution rate, θt, and the credited individual contribution rate, θa, in the model.
6 C. Vidal-Meliá et al.
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If the amount of the pension is determined from the individual notional capital
without considering the survivor dividend, then the new balanced contribution rate, ht ,
and the credited individual contribution rate, θa, are different because the retirement
beneﬁts are strictly lower than they should be (as the survivor dividend is not dis-
tributed among the survivors).
The relation between both contribution rates can be expressed using the so-called
dividend effect, as shown in formula (9):
ha ¼ ht 
KacðxeþA;tÞ
KiðxeþA;tÞ
¼ ht  1þ
DacðxeþA;tÞ
KiðxeþA;tÞ
zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{Dividend effect[ 00BBB@
1
CCCA ¼ ht  PðxeþA;tÞPiðxeþA;tÞ (9)
where KiðxeþA;tÞ is the average individual accumulated notional capital at time t for
individuals aged xe + A, without taking into account the survivor dividend, and PiðxeþA;tÞ
is the average pension of an individual who retires at the ordinary age at t, again with-
out considering the dividend.
The dividend effect measures either the increase in the initial retirement pension
after inclusion of the survivor dividend or the decrease in the balanced contribution
rate, if the dividend is not included in the pension calculation. Therefore, ha[ ht
because the scheme saved money by not including the survivor dividend.
If ht ¼ ha was contributed instead of ht , the pension scheme would continuously
accumulate ﬁnancial reserves because ignoring the survivor dividend produces sav-
ings when longevity is constant over time. In practice, these reserves could ﬁnance
the increase in spending on pensions resulting from increases in longevity and/or
legacy costs from old pension systems. Indeed, in Poland and Latvia, these revenues
provide funds for other social insurance commitments that have no speciﬁc source
of funding. Both countries decided to introduce funded components and, as a result,
the revenue for the PAYG pillars was reduced due to contributions being transferred
to funded accounts. Hence, the inheritance gains help to cover the double payment
burden.
In year t, assuming constant longevity, the amount of the scheme’s surplus, St, is
easy to quantify because it is connected to the survivor dividend, speciﬁcally to the
average accumulated dividend:
St ¼ ðha  ht Þ 
XA1
k¼0
yðxeþk;tÞ  Nðxeþk;tÞ ¼ NðxeþA;tÞ  ðKacðxeþA;tÞ  K
i
ðxeþA;tÞÞ
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{DacðxeþA;tÞ
(10)
The cost of longevity measured as the increase in life expectancy at retirement age,
DexeþA, that could be ﬁnanced if the dividend were not distributed, in the simplest case
where k ¼ G, can be quantiﬁed following the reasoning presented in Appendix 1.
3. Numerical example
This section presents a numerical example to illustrate the important role played by the
survivor dividend in the NDC framework. To do this, we basically use the closed-form
expressions developed in Section 2.
Individuals are assumed to join the labour market at the age of 16 (xe), and
onwards, and contribute 16% (ha) of their contribution base until they reach 65
Journal of Economic Policy Reform 7
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(xe + A). The individual contribution bases grow at an annual accumulative rate (g) of
1.6%, while the retirement pension, once settled, is constant in real terms (k ¼ 0).
For the purposes of comparison, the mortality tables7 used are those for Poland in
2009 (PL), Latvia in 2010 (LT) and Sweden (SW) in 2011.8
3.1. Baseline case: zero population growth
In the case of zero population growth, all individuals enter the labour market at the age
of 16 and work continuously until retiring at age 65. The amount of pension payable to
individuals aged 65 is determined, after 49 contribution years, according to the formu-
las shown in the previous section. Under this scenario, the balanced contribution rate
(ht) is 16% and coincides with the credited contribution rate (ha).
The ﬁrst vertical axis of Figure 1 (see after Table 1) shows the number of contribu-
tors and pensioners by age depending on the mortality scenario (SW, PL or LT) in a
mature state from a cross-sectional point of view. The second vertical axis represents
the contribution base and pension structure under the three different mortality scenarios
(SW-w&p, PL-w&p and LT-w&p).
The main values making up the scheme’s ﬁnancial equilibrium under the three
mortality tables are shown in Table 1.
It can be seen that the mortality pattern has a signiﬁcant effect on the amount of
the retirement pensions provided by the scheme. Under the mortality scenario, with the
highest life expectancy (Figure 1, SW, dotted black line), the actuarially fair pensions
are much lower than those under the other mortality scenarios (PL, in solid black line,
and LT, in dashed black line). Consequently, under the SW mortality scenario, the
annuity divisor, €akxeþA, used to calculate the amount of the initial retirement pension is
higher (17.23) than those under the other mortality scenarios (15.05 and 14.39 for PL
and LT, respectively).
Given that the initial assumptions are analogous for all three scenarios, mortality
rates play a crucial role in achieving the scheme’s ﬁnancial equilibrium. As Table 1
Figure 1. Structure of contributors, pensioners, wages and pensions under different mortality
tables.
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shows for the SW scenario, the scheme’s dependency rate (drt) is higher (38.86%) than
the other two scenarios (30.20 and 27.57% for PL and LT, respectively), whereas the
scheme’s ﬁnancial rate (frt) is lower (41.18% as against 52.98 and 58.04% for PL and
LT, respectively). These results come naturally from formula (6). If there is a DC rate,
θt, ﬁxed over time, and if the dependency ratio is determined by the mortality scenario,
then the ﬁnancial ratio has to be adapted accordingly.
For the SW scenario, the amount of the pension once settled at retirement age,
bðxeþA;tÞ, amounts to 68.77% of the average salary. The impact of the dividend effect,
Det, on the initial pension is not very signiﬁcant, as it would only rise by 7.39% after
the balances of participants who do not survive to retirement are distributed. For the
same scenario, if the survivor dividend were not included in the calculation of the ini-
tial retirement pension, a discrepancy would arise between the credited contribution rate
equal to 16%, ht, and the rate necessary to ﬁnance the pension, h

t , in this case,
14.90%. As can be seen in formula (9), the direct link between both rates is the
dividend effect Det ¼ ðht=ht Þ  1.
The impact of the dividend effect, Det, on the initial pension is not insigniﬁcant for
the other two scenarios, with the pension rising by 18.32% using the Polish mortality
tables (PL) and 23.12% using the Latvian tables (LT). As a result, the replacement rates
reached are also higher due to inclusion of the dividend. There is a direct relation
between the dividend effect and the replacement rates. Indeed, with the variables pro-
vided in Table 1, it is easy to see that Det ¼ ðbðxeþA;tÞ=b
i
ðxeþA;tÞÞ  1.
As seen in Table 1, if the survivor dividend were not included in the calculation of
the initial retirement pension, the pension scheme could handle an unexpected increase
in life expectancy at retirement age (DexeþA) of between 1.48 and 3.76 years, depending
on the scenario, before exhausting the accumulated surplus. Again, the dividend effect
can be used to explain the increase in life expectancy at retirement needed to neutralize
the lack of dividend. Given this, it is not difﬁcult to check in Table 1 that
Det ¼ DexeþA=exeþA.
3.2. Population changes
The growth in population means that the retirees’ generation can be split into A
different cohorts, whose common factor is the number of years contributed since
Table 1. NDC scheme with survivor dividend: some selected values.
Description variable Notation PL LT SW
Credited rate = balanced rate % (ha ¼ ht) 16.00 16.00 16.00
Balanced rate without SD % ht 13.52 13.00 14.90
Dividend effect % Det 18.32 23.12 7.39
Demographic ratio % drt 30.20 27.57 38.86
Financial ratio % frt 52.98 58.04 41.18
Annuity divisor €akxeþA 15.05 14.39 17.23
Life expectancy exeþA (years) 17.10 16.24 19.99
Change in life expectancy DexeþA (years) 3.13 3.76 1.48
Replacement rate with SD % bðxeþA;tÞ 86.75 94.39 68.77
Replacement rate without SD % b
i
ðxeþA;tÞ 73.32 76.66 64.04
Retirement age xe + A (years) 16 + 49 = 65 65 65
Note: Base scenario with G = (1.016)(1.00) − 1 = 0.016.
Journal of Economic Policy Reform 9
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 V
ale
nc
ia]
 at
 03
:41
 16
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
joining the labour market. This section explores two additional assumptions about the
rate of population growth: (1) that the number of contributors of all ages grows at an
annual rate of γ = 0.01 over time (henceforth, PL+) and (2) that the number of contrib-
utors of all ages decreases by an annual rate of γ = −0.01 (henceforth, PL−). The Polish
mortality scenario (referred to in the previous section as PL) is taken as a reference
when analysing the effect of population changes, whether increases or decreases,
because its survivor dividend has an average effect on the results, falling between the
other two scenarios.
The results presented in the previous subsection are recalculated taking into account
the effect of population changes under the two additional assumptions described above.
Figure 2 is included later in this subsection for a better understanding of what happens
when the economically active population grows. In addition, the relationship between
the IRR for contributors by years of contributions and the IRR for the scheme itself is
studied under the population growth scenario. The main results are shown in Figures 3
and 4.
The main values making up the scheme’s ﬁnancial equilibrium under the three
population scenarios are shown in Table 2.
What really draws the attention is that the ratio between the number of contributors
and pensioners, the ratio between the average salary and pension and the effect of the
survivor dividend remain unchanged when the economically active population is not
constant over time. However, the explanation is obvious. Given that the contribution
rate is the same under the three population scenarios, the ratio between the number of
pensioners and the number of contributors (drt) must also be the same because it
depends on the mortality scenario and, according to Equation (11) in Appendix 1, the
ratio stabilizes because both groups evolve (increase or decrease) at exactly the same
rate as the population growth (γ). Therefore, according to Equation (6), the scheme’s
average replacement rate (frt) has to be the same for all three population scenarios.
Figure 2. Dividend effect for PL with population growth by years of contributions.
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The rate of population growth has a direct effect on the sustainable scheme’s rate
of return (G), which in the NDC framework largely determines the amount of the initial
retirement beneﬁt provided by the schemes. Consequently, the higher the population
growth, the higher the amount of accumulated notional capital, which implies a higher
amount of initial pension.
Figure 3. Expected IRRðxeþA;AK;tÞ taking into account the survivor dividend, with γ = 0.01 and
by the age of entry to the labour market.
Figure 4. Evolution of IRRðxeþs;tÞ by age attained, with γ = 0.01, for contributors who joined
the labour market at the age of 16.
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The scheme’s sustainability derives from an adjustment to the average initial pen-
sion, directly linked to the annuity factor, €akxeþA, and the accumulated notional capital
reached at retirement age. With an annual increase in population of γ = 0.01 and for a
given amount of credited notional capital at retirement age, the initial amount of the
pension awarded will be higher than with a decrease in population of 1% (γ = −0.01)
or constant population growth of 0% (γ = 0). This is because the higher the value of G,
the lower the value of the annuity divisor (13.73 for the increase in population as
against 16.59 for the decrease and 15.05 for constant population, respectively).
In our example, generation members who retire at age 65 could come from any of
49 different cohorts, depending on the number of years contributed. This determines 49
(A) different amounts of pension that set the generation’s average initial pension linked
to the average number of years contributed by those who reach retirement age. There-
fore, growth in the economically active population brings about changes in the average
years contributed (AYC), as shown in Table 2. Under the assumption that the number
of contributors of all ages grows at an annual rate of γ = 0.01 over time, the AYC is
38.97 as opposed to 49 for γ = 0 or γ = −0.01, where all the contributors who reach
retirement age started working at the entry age of 16, i.e. A years ago. It can be said
that the value assigned to γ has an inverse inﬂuence on the AYC for the generation that
retires at time t.
In spite of the growth in population that brings about a reduction in the AYC (see
Table 2), the average replacement rate, bðxeþA;tÞ, reached for PL
+ is even higher
(95.07%) than in the other two cases (78.68 and 86.75% for PL− and PL, respectively).
The data provided in Table 2 clearly show us that the amount of pension with an
equal number of years of contributions in the case of positive population growth is
much higher than for the case of stable population and higher than for a decrease in
population. This is to be expected given that the scheme’s sustainable return with
population growth is higher.
Another underlying issue is whether or not the variation in population has an inﬂu-
ence on the dividend effect. According to the data shown in Table 2, the dividend
effect remains constant for any value of γ, but we need to study what happens when
the population increases. In the case of population growth, there is a vector of pensions
– A different pensions – so it is important to ﬁnd out whether the impact of the divi-
dend remains constant for cohorts belonging to the same generation of retirees, when
there are changes in the rate of population growth.
Table 2. NDC system with survivor dividend and population changes: some selected values.
Description variables Notation PL+ PL− PL
Balanced rate without SD % (ha ¼ ht) 16.00
Dividend effect % ht 13.52
Credited rate=balanced rate % Det 18.32
Demographic ratio % drt 30.20
Financial ratio % frt 52.98
Annuity divisor €akxeþA 13.73 16.59 15.05
Replacement rate with SD % bðxeþA;tÞ 95.07 78.68 86.75
Replacement rate without SD % b
i
ðxeþA;tÞ 80.35 66.50 73.32
Average years contributed AYC 38.97 49 49
Sustainable scheme’s rate of return % G 2.616 0.584 1.60
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The answer can be seen in Figure 2, which shows the dividend effect for each of
the A cohorts that make up the retirees’ generation under the assumption that the pop-
ulation grows annually at a constant rate of 0.01, 0.02 or 0.04. For the values of γ
assumed, the AYCs are 38.97, 31.67 and 22.20, respectively, given that γ has an
inverse inﬂuence on the AYC for the generation that retires at time t.
Figure 2 shows that, for example, under the assumption that the population grows
annually at a constant rate of 0.01 (represented by the solid line), those contributors
who reach retirement age having started working at the earliest age possible, i.e. age
16, beneﬁt from a dividend effect of 19.07%. This is higher than the dividend effect
with zero population growth (18.32%), but lower than for the scenarios in which the
population grows annually at a constant rate of 2% or 4%, represented by the dashed
and dotted lines, respectively. Under the scenario with the highest population growth,
the dividend effect for contributors who started working at the earliest age reaches
20.99%, whereas for the intermediate assumption, it is 19.77%. And it is not only con-
tributors with 49 contributed years that obtain a higher than average dividend effect,
many other contributor cohorts with fewer years of contributions also obtain a higher
survivor dividend. For example, as shown in Figure 2, under the scenario with the
highest population growth, the dividend effect for those cohorts with more than
33 years of contributions is higher than the average, whereas for those cohorts with
fewer than 33 contributed years, it is lower.
Under the other two population scenarios, the number of years contributed are 38
and 42 for γ = 0.02 and γ = 0.01, respectively.
Population growth therefore enables cohorts with more years of contributions to
beneﬁt to a greater extent from the dividend effect. The more the number of contribu-
tors grows, the larger the pension for cohorts with more years of contributions com-
pared to what it would have been without including the survivor dividend.
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the average effect of the dividend remains
constant for any value of γ.
3.2.1. The contributors’ IRR and its relation to the scheme’s IRR (G)
To provide a numerical illustration, we will look at the relationship between the
contributors’ IRR and that for the scheme itself under the population growth scenario.
Generally speaking, the contributors’ IRR – with or without the survivor dividend –
depends on the age of entry to the labour market and the time the calculation is done
(at the age of entry, at retirement age, s years after entering the labour market, etc.). As
we will see later, this is because the age reached by the contributor is very important
when computing the IRR. The impact of these two conditioning factors underlying the
results of the contributors’ IRR is explored in Figures 3 and 4.
For the three mortality scenarios (SW, dotted line; PL, solid line; and LT, dashed
line), Figure 3 presents the expected IRRðxeþA;AK;tÞ for contributors who reach retire-
ment age taking into account the survivor dividend and distinguishing by the age of
entry to the labour market, i.e. according to the number of years contributed.
The ﬁgure also compares the cohort IRRs with the scheme’s IRR (G, dash–dot
line), which is the same as the return that contributors would get, if the survivor divi-
dend were not included when calculating the initial retirement pension. As expected,
the IRR decreases as the age of entry to the labour market increases because the con-
tributors beneﬁt less from the distribution of deceased persons’ contributions. It can
also be observed that, depending on the mortality scenario, the IRR varies between
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3.41% for SW (the scenario with the lowest mortality rates) and 5.41% for LT (the
scenario with the highest mortality rates) at a labour market entry age of 16. This dif-
ference between mortality scenarios tends to decrease as the age of entry to the labour
market increases. If the individual joins the labour market at the age of 56, the IRR
varies between 2.97% for SW and 3.74% for LT.
Hence, the individuals’ IRR varies signiﬁcantly depending on the number of con-
tribution years for each cohort within the same generation, and contributors who reach
retirement age always get a higher return than the scheme because their notional capital
also includes contributions from afﬁliates who die before reaching retirement age.
Figure 4 shows the results of the study set for cohorts of contributors who joined
the labour market at the earliest age possible, i.e. 16 in our example, differentiating by
the age attained.
The outcomes when the survivor dividend is taken into account, IRRðsdÞðxeþs;tÞ, are
represented in Figure 4 as SW (dotted black line), PL (solid black line) and LT (dashed
black line). It can be seen that the IRR increases with age, due to the fact that the sur-
vivors’ accumulated notional capital increases yearly as a result of the distribution of
the dividend.
The results when the survivor dividend is not taken into account are represented in
Figure 4 as SW* (dotted grey line), PL* (dotted grey line) and LT* (dashed grey line).
A maximum return equal to G is only achieved by survivors who reach retirement age,
and therefore the scheme permanently accumulates reserves, if the dividend is not
included when calculating the pension.
The results shown in Figure 4 do not exactly match one of the stated properties for
NDCs according to Palmer (2006): Property 1. At any time the present value of an
individual’s lifetime beneﬁt equals the individual’s account balance. For each partici-
pant and at all times, the amount in the account, K, is the present or expected value of
his or her beneﬁt. The value of the account is determined by the individual’s own con-
tributions and the system’s internal rate of return; and Diamond (2006): An NDC is
supposed to provide beneﬁts for different cohorts that have a present discounted value
that equals the value of the account, using the internal rate of return (IRR) (of the sys-
tem) for a discount rate.
When they say the system’s internal rate of return or the internal rate of return
(IRR) (of the system), both authors seem to be referring to what in this paper has been
deﬁned as G. Hence, the property stated by Palmer (2006), IRR = G, is only fulﬁlled in
two speciﬁc cases for the contribution cohort that joins the labour market at the earliest
possible age.
Case 1: When the IRR is computed at the age of entry into the labour market under
the assumption that the survivor dividend is taken into account to calculate the
retirement beneﬁt.
Case 2: When the IRR is valued at retirement age under the assumption that the
survivor dividend is not taken into account to calculate the retirement beneﬁt.
Both cases are identiﬁed in Figure 4 for contributors who entered the labour market at
the earliest possible age. For all other cases, depending on whether or not the scheme
takes the survivor dividend into account when calculating the retirement pension, the
expected IRR for different contributors is (very) different from G, and this difference
depends on the number of years expected to be contributed and the survival probabili-
ties attributed to afﬁliates.
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4. Concluding comments and directions for future research
Among those countries in which NDC schemes have been introduced, only Sweden
applies what is known as the survivor dividend. Surprisingly, little attention has been
given to this subject in the economic literature and not even the report published by
the Swedish authorities explains in any depth why this survivor dividend is applied.
As far as we are aware, the paper by Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá (2014) is the
only one that has shed any light on whether it would be justiﬁed to include the survivor
dividend when calculating afﬁliate pension balances in an NDC framework. In the pre-
sent paper, we have extended their model to account for changes in the economically
active population and the effect of the survivor dividend on the relationship between the
individual’s IRR for contributors who reach retirement age and the scheme’s IRR.
We ﬁnd that when the active population changes, the model endorses the idea that
the survivor dividend has a sound basis which enables the NDC scheme to achieve
ﬁnancial equilibrium. To put it another way, the paper demonstrates that the survivor
dividend enables the balanced contribution rate applied to be the same as the individual
credited rate. A similar outcome was reached by Palmer (2012) regarding the equiva-
lence between these two contribution rates in an NDC framework, but without explic-
itly considering the effect of the survivor dividend.
We also ﬁnd that the average effect of the survivor dividend remains unchanged for
any constant annual rate of population growth, that contributors who reach retirement
age always get a higher return than the scheme does, and that population growth
enables cohorts with more years of contributions to beneﬁt to a greater extent from the
dividend effect. The higher the number of contributors, the higher the pension for those
cohorts with more years of contributions, compared to what they would have received
without inclusion of the survivor dividend.
On the practical side, it can be said that the numerical example developed in the
paper is close to reality. It conﬁrms that our model really works because the results
make sense and provide us with some useful values regarding the magnitude of the
dividend effect, the unexpected increase in life expectancy at retirement age that the
NDC scheme could handle, if the survivor dividend were not included in the calcula-
tion of the initial retirement pension, and the contributors’ IRR computed according to
a set of different scenarios.
In short, this topic is particularly important for the design of pension reforms, and
therefore this research could have a considerable impact for those countries that are cur-
rently rethinking the structure of their public pension systems. Taking the survivor divi-
dend explicitly into account increases the political attractiveness of the reform by
providing higher initial retirement beneﬁts. The issue of transparency is also important
because not including the dividend means that systems tend to accumulate ﬁnancial
resources (as in countries such as Poland, Italy and Latvia) as a non-transparent way to
protect their systems against the longevity risk and/or to ﬁnance legacy costs from for-
mer pension arrangements.
Finally, based on the model presented in this paper, a number of important direc-
tions for future research can be identiﬁed.
First, the coverage of any unexpected increase in longevity in cases where the SD
is not distributed could be explored further in order to evaluate whether the SD is a
potential solution for covering longevity risk in NDCs. Increases in longevity can be
reﬂected not only by an increase in life expectancy at retirement age, but also by a
decrease in mortality rates or an increase in survival probabilities. Probabilities,
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meanwhile, can be evaluated as being either constant over time or age speciﬁc depend-
ing on the mortality model.
The second direction would consist of evaluating the impact of introducing a
minimum pension on the scheme’s ﬁnancial equilibrium. According to Holzmann and
Palmer (2006), NDC schemes should be supplemented with a minimum income
(pension) guarantee. For Barr and Diamond (2009), the purpose of pensions is to pro-
vide an adequate income stream when the individual is unable to work due to disability
or retirement, so it would be a good idea to introduce a minimum pension in order to
maintain a minimum standard of living.
Third, it would be interesting to design a fully integrated NDC model with retire-
ment and permanent disability. An NDC scheme is widely deﬁned as a PAYG scheme
that deliberately mimics an FDC scheme. In most countries with mandatory individual
capitalization accounts (Reyes 2010), disability insurance is fully integrated into the
FDC scheme. At the same time, according to Autor and Duggan (2006), OECD (2010)
and Burkhauser et al. (2014), disability insurance is a big challenge for policy-makers
today. Hence, given that NDC schemes have positive features that could help to
improve the efﬁciency of disability insurance, it would be useful to develop a theoreti-
cal model that fully integrated the disability contingency into an NDC framework. The
methodology developed by Ventura-Marco and Vidal-Meliá (2014) could be a reference
for designing this integrated model.
Finally, insurance innovation could be incorporated into the model, as proposed by
Murtaugh, Spillman, and Warshawsky (2001) and Brown and Warshawsky (2013) for
funded systems, by integrating retirement and long-term care (LTC) annuities. The
NDC framework could be useful for this purpose. This suggestion stems from the fact
that LTC as a contributory contingency has been provided in the German contributory
pension system (Rothgang 2010) since the mid-1990s. Barr (2010) also gives sound
reasons for extending social security to provide mandatory cover for LTC.
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Notes
1. In Brazil, the NDC reform was adopted only for the private sector.
2. See, for example, Lindbeck and Persson (2003), Williamson (2004), Börsch-Supan (2006),
Holzmann and Palmer (2006), Vidal-Melia, Domínguez-Fabián, and Devesa-Carpio (2006),
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Auerbach and Lee (2009), Vidal-Meliá, Boado-Penas, and Settergren (2009, 2010),
Whitehouse (2010), Auerbach and Lee (2011), Chłoń-Domińczak, Franco, and Palmer
(2012), Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá (2012) and Holzmann, Palmer, and Robalino (2012).
3. It is important not to confuse the concept of the survivor dividend (which mainly depends
on mortality rates at speciﬁc ages) with the so-called “demographic dividend”, Ross (2004),
which is linked to fertility dynamics.
4. See Kritzer, Kay, and Sinha (2011). One possible way of designing programmed or phased
withdrawal is when the afﬁliate receives a pension charged on the balance of their individual
capitalization account which, by remaining under the responsibility and management of the
administrator, allows the retiree to beneﬁt from the return on the fund. The pension is ﬁxed
for periods of one year and the amount is calculated by taking into account the balance of
the individual account, the technical rate of interest deﬁned by law and the life expectancy
of the worker and their family according to legal mortality tables.
5. In this model, the terms dependency ratio, old-age ratio and demographic ratio are used as
synonyms given that everybody participates in the labour market.
6. A contributor can reach retirement age as active or disabled. In the case of Sweden, the
current regulations on disability pension are closely linked to the old-age pension system.
According to Chłoń-Domińczak, Franco, and Palmer (2012), the Swedish model for retire-
ment pension rights for persons receiving disability beneﬁts is to impute and pay contribu-
tions for insured periods of disability into the retirement contingency. These payments, made
annually from general tax revenues, are entered on the country’s accounts as a cost for the
disability system and are part of the transfer from state revenues to the NDC pension fund.
Disability beneﬁts are converted into retirement beneﬁts at age 65.
7. Observed mortality rates are only used and not the population structure by ages.
8. Years with the latest information available according to the Human Mortality Database
(http://www.mortality.org/). Date accessed 10-05-2013.
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Appendix 1. Proofs of some formulas/equations included in Section 2
A1. Financial and dependency ratios in the mature state
Once the mature state is reached, the ratio between the number of pensioners and the number of
contributors – (drt) – stabilizes because both groups evolve (increase or decrease) exactly equal
to rate γ:
drt ¼
XwxeA1
k¼0
NðxeþAþk;1Þð1þcÞt1k
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{Pensioners¼Rt
ð1þ cÞt1 
XA1
k¼0
Nðxeþk;1Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Contributors¼Ct
¼
PwxeA1
k¼0
NðxeþAþk;tÞð1þcÞkPA1
k¼0
Nðxeþk;tÞ
¼ drtþ1 ¼    ¼ dr ¼ RC
(11)
Also, the system’s average replacement rate, expressed by the ﬁnancial ratio, is already constant
due to the fact that the numerator and denominator evolve equally (at the rate of variation in
wages):
frt ¼
PðxeþA;tÞ 
Xw1xeA
k¼0
NðxeþAþk;tÞFk
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{Expenditure on pensions
Xw1xeA
k¼0
NðxeþAþk;tÞð1þcÞk|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Pensioners¼Rt
XA1
k¼0
yðxeþk;tÞ  Nðxeþk;tÞ
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{Aggregate contribution base
XA1
k¼0
Nðxeþk;tÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Contributors¼Ct
¼
Ptþ1
Wtþ1
¼    ¼
P
W
¼ fr (12)
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A2. Relationship between contribution rates
The relationship between the credited contribution rate and the balanced rate according to
formulas (4) and (6) is:
ha 
XA1
k¼0
Nðxeþk;AþkþtÞ  yðxeþk;AþkþtÞ  ð1þ GÞAk
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{
PA1
k¼0
yðxeþk;tÞNðxeþk;tÞ
NðxeþA;tÞ  €akxeþA
 NðxeþA;tÞ  €akxeþA|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Expenditure on pensions
¼ ht 
XA1
k¼0
yðxeþk;tÞ  Nðxeþk;tÞ
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{Aggregate contributions
(13)
Therefore, it is easy to see that θa = θt.
The amount of the pension ignoring the survivor dividend is calculated as follows:
PiðxeþA;tÞ ¼
ha 
XA1
k¼0
yðxeþk;AþkþtÞ  ð1þ GÞAk
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{KiðxeþA;tÞ
€akxeþA
¼
PA
c¼1
PiðxeþA;c;tÞ  NðxeþA;c;tÞ
NðxeþA;tÞ
(14)
where PiðxeþA;tÞ is the average pension, without taking into account the survivor dividend, of an
individual who retires at the ordinary age at t. It is a weighted average pension depending on the
A different pensions that can be awarded.
Then,
PiðxeþA;tÞ 
Xw1xeA
k¼0
NðxeþAþk;tÞFk|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Expenditure on pensions
¼ ht 
XA1
k¼0
yðxeþk;tÞ  Nðxeþk;tÞ
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{Aggregate contributions
(15)
and substituting the expression for PiðxeþA;tÞ, we get:
ha ¼ ht 
KacðxeþA;tÞ
KiðxeþA;tÞ
¼ ht  1þ
DacðxeþA;tÞ
KiðxeþA;tÞ
zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{Dividend effect0BBB@
1
CCCA (16)
A3. The increase in life expectancy at retirement age, DexeþA, that could be
ﬁnanced if the dividend were not distributed
If the survivor dividend is included:
PðxeþA;tÞ ¼
KiðxeþA;tÞ þ D
ac
ðxeþA;tÞ
€akxeþA
¼
KacðxeþA;tÞ
€akxeþA
[ PiðxeþA;tÞ ¼
KiðxeþA;tÞ
€akxeþA
(17)
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However, given the assumption that k ¼ G, it can be shown that:
€akxeþA ¼
XwxeA1
k¼0
FkkpxeþA ¼
XwxeA1
k¼0
kpxeþA ¼ 1þ exeþA (18)
where exeþA is the curtate expectation of life for an individual aged xe + A, i.e. the expected
number of complete years remaining for an individual aged xe + A to live.
Hence, formula (19) should necessarily be fulﬁlled to neutralize the survivor dividend:
PðxeþA;tÞ ¼ P
i
ðxeþA;tÞ if and only if P
i
ðxeþA;tÞ ¼
KiðxeþA;tÞ
1þ e0xeþA
(19)
where
e0xeþA\exeþA (20)
Therefore,
exeþA  e0xeþA ¼ DexeþA[ 0 (21)
with DexeþA being the increase in life expectancy at the ordinary retirement age, measured in
years, that would neutralize the effect of the survivor dividend.
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